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I. INTRODUCTION: LOSS OF PRIVACY AND CONSUMER HARM 
Search and related online services have provoked debates in 
recent years about the loss of individual privacy, but this is often 
framed more around an individual sense of unease at the 
surveillance of peoples’ private lives than how a shift in knowledge 
about individuals to corporate hands should force us to reevaluate 
our economic models and regulatory tools. 
The lack of analysis of the consumer harm from loss of data 
privacy is one reason Google, despite its clear dominance of search 
advertising, has escaped antitrust prosecution so far in the United 
States. An antitrust case must show harm to consumers,1 and 
Google’s defenders often deny that consumers lose anything from 
their interaction with Google. “It’s . . . impossible to find any way in 
which consumer welfare is currently being harmed by Google,” 
writes George Mason University’s Adam Thierer, “[a]ll their 
products are free and constantly evolving.”2 Or as David Balto 
 
 1.  Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 
224 (1993) (“It is axiomatic that the antitrust laws were passed for ‘the protection 
of competition, not competitors.’”); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 
(1979) (“Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare 
prescription.’”); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (“It is 
competition, not competitors, which the [Sherman] Act protects.”); see also United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“[T]o be 
condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist’s act must . . . harm the competitive 
process and thereby harm consumers. In contrast, harm to one or more competitors 
will not suffice.”). 
 2.  Adam Thierer, Can There Be a Market for Unpaid Search Results and Could 
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2014] THE COSTS OF LOST PRIVACY 851 
elegantly puts it, “Consumers’ pocketbooks do not see Google as 
any type of monopolist.”3 Complaints about Google are largely 
dismissed as the whining of competitors, who might gain at the 
expense of Google, but not to the benefit of consumers, according 
to these Google defenders.4 
When the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found no 
antitrust violation in Google’s dominance of “search” in January 
2013, the FTC majority similarly argued for their position largely 
from finding no consumer harm from how Google might 
manipulate search results to the disadvantage of potential rival 
websites.5 Yet the analysis of the FTC’s majority opinion looked only 
at users’ interests in accurate search results without ever analyzing 
how Google’s control of user data might impact consumer welfare.6 
Only FTC Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch expressed in a partial 
dissent the concern that Google’s “monopoly or near-monopoly 
 
Google Be Classified as a Public Utility?, ANTITRUST & COMPETITION POL’Y BLOG 
(May 21, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2012 
/05/can-there-be-a-market-for-unpaid-search-results-and-could-google-be-classified 
-as-a-public-utility-c-1.html. See also Jim Miller & Dan Oliver, An Antitrust Probe of 
Google?, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Dec. 20, 2011, 5:00 PM), http://www.nationalreview 
.com/bench-memos/286349/antitrust-probe-google-jim-miller (“[C]onsumers are 
reaping enormous benefits from the free service designed to reflect their 
choices.”). 
 3.  David Balto, Google Is No Microsoft, HUFFINGTON POST (June 30, 2011, 6:41 
PM), http://huff.to/jfDamv (“[C]onsumers face zero switching costs!”). 
 4.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER 
REMEDIES 2 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines 
/272350.pdf (noting that a “remedy should focus on preserving competition, not 
protecting individual competitors”); Geoffrey Manne & Berin Szoka, Some Much-
Needed Antitrust Skepticism on Senate Letter Urging FTC Google Investigation, TRUTH 
ON MARKET (Dec. 20, 2011), http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/12/20/some 
-much-needed-antitrust-skepticism-on-senate-letter-urging-ftc-google-investigation/ 
(“[H]arm to competitors is not the same thing as harm to consumers or 
competition more generally . . . .”). 
 5.  Google Inc., FTC File No. 111-0163, at 3 (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www 
.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/statement-commission 
-regarding-googles-search-practices/130103brillgooglesearchstmt.pdf (statement 
of the Federal Trade Commission regarding Google’s search practices) 
(“[C]hanges to Google’s search algorithm could reasonably be viewed as 
improving the overall quality of Google’s search results . . . .”). 
 6.  Id. at 3. 
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power in the search advertising market” is derived from control of 
user data obtained through deceptive means.7 
Expanding on the concerns expressed in Rosch’s dissent, this 
article will detail how understanding the dynamics of data mining 
and behavioral targeting reveal the clear harm to consumers from 
Google’s monopoly of the online search advertising market. 
A. The Pervasive Consumer Harm from Google’s Facilitation of User 
Targeting by Its Advertisers 
The most obvious harm is the undermining of competition in 
the online advertising market, where higher prices charged to 
advertisers inevitably get passed onto consumers in the form of 
higher prices for the advertised goods and services they buy. I have 
detailed the clear monopoly dominance of the search advertising 
sector by Google and the ensuing general consumer harm from 
such dominance elsewhere.8 So, this article will focus on the more 
pervasive harm to consumers from the stunted “market” for user 
data itself, where lack of vigorous competition means users too 
readily share that data at too low a price—usually for free in 
exchange for software services that cost companies like Google far 
less than the value of the user data they collect. 
Linked to that extraction of user data is the way Google helps 
facilitate the engagement of advertisers in user profiling that aids 
those companies in extracting the maximum profit possible from 
consumers in the overall economy. Advertisers can deliver ads not 
just to the users most likely to be interested in the product, but can 
tailor prices for individual consumers in ways that can maximize 
the revenue extracted from each purchaser. A story in 2012 about 
the travel site Orbitz steering Mac owners to higher-priced hotels 
and PC owners to lower-priced ones is a basic example of such a 
 
 7.  Google Inc., FTC File No. 111-0163, at 1 n.1 (Jan. 3, 2013) (Rosch, 
Comm’r, concurring and dissenting), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files 
/documents/public_statements/concurring-and-dissenting-statement-commission 
er-j.thomas-rosch-regarding-googles-search-practices/130103googlesearchstmt.pdf 
(concurring and dissenting statement of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch 
Regarding Google’s Search Practices) [hereinafter Rosch’s Statement]. 
 8.  Nathan Newman, Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of 
User Data, 31 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming Summer 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2309547. 
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strategy,9 although the practice encompasses everything from 
offering promotional discounts only to selected customers to 
targeting subprime mortgage offers online at likely victims—which 
were advertised heavily on Google during the company’s economic 
rise.10 There is also strong evidence, including massive financial 
sanctions against Google, that this targeting of ads empowers 
criminal and “tawdry” (in Internet analyst Jaron Lanier’s words)11 
companies to exploit users online. At its worst, this data-mining-
supported targeting of consumers may be empowering racial 
profiling in new and disturbing ways as well.12 
Joseph Stiglitz and allied economic thinkers argue increasing 
information asymmetry feeds increasing economic inequality as 
well, such that the “result from the new information economics is 
that issues of efficiency and equity cannot easily be delinked.”13 The 
fact that many of Google’s largest advertising customers in the mid-
part of the last decade were linked to the subprime mortgage 
industry, as will be detailed later in this article,14 is just one 
indicator that understanding the dynamics of the search 
advertising sector may give insight into larger theoretical problems 
of market failure, the harm from predatory firms, and why we have 
seen rising economic inequality in the economy over recent 
decades. 
As this article will detail, Google’s ascension as a dominant 
player across a range of Internet services is giving its advertisers a 
whole series of tools to target customers based on their individual 
preferences, physical location, and other characteristics. This is 
part of a rising asymmetry in knowledge between companies and 
their customers across the economy due to the rise of data mining 
and the power of “big data.” 
 
 9.  Dana Matiolli, On Orbitz, Mac Users Steered to Pricier Hotels, WALL ST. J., June 
26, 2012, at A1, available at LEXIS. 
 10.  See infra Part V.C. 
 11.  John Brockman, The Local-Global Flip, or, “The Lanier Effect”: A Conversation 
with Jaron Lanier, EDGE (Aug. 29, 2011), http://edge.org/conversation/the-local 
-global-flip. 
 12.  See infra Part V.A. 
 13.  Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, 
92 AM. ECON. REV. 460, 479 (2002); see also George A. Akerlof, The Market for 
Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488–500 
(1970). 
 14.  See infra Part IV. 
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B. Using Antitrust to Address Economic Inequality Due to Monopoly 
With the information asymmetries driven by data mining and 
behavioral profiling, Google facilitates exploitation of user data in 
the online marketplace in ways that de facto transfer wealth 
between the broader population to the company’s corporate 
advertisers. The primary user harm identified by this analysis is not 
just narrow economic profits returned to Google, but a much more 
fundamental enrichment of its advertisers at the expense of 
average consumers’ wallets and privacy. Given that, this analysis 
also challenges the narrow conception of antitrust as a tool for 
maintaining competition in the abstract and argues for it being 
seen as a broader tool for promoting economic equality in more 
structural terms. 
While many antitrust scholars such as Robert Bork have seen 
antitrust action as a limited tool for restoring the natural allocative 
efficiency of the market,15 information economics scholars such as 
Stiglitz argue that information asymmetry creates continual 
disruptions of any “natural” market equilibrium. With no simple, 
single equilibrium price and no single measure of “efficiency” 
based on such an equilibrium, any pure efficiency analysis fails. 
This is especially true in information markets themselves like 
online advertising, where promoting more demand and convincing 
customers to pay a higher price than they might have under any 
supposed equilibrium price is the goal of advertising in the first 
place. Advertising’s very existence is based on the reality—often 
ignored in Chicago School-style economics—that individuals are 
not perfectly informed of prices and quality differences, so there is 
not necessarily an equilibrium price.16 And in a case where firms 
can differentiate between customers, as Google allows through 
behavioral profiling based on user data, traditional neoclassical 
market analyses further fail as sellers slice markets into segments 
based as much on the relative ignorance of different market 
 
 15.  See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 107–15 (1978). 
 16.  S. Salop & J.E. Stiglitz, The Theory of Sales: A Simple Model of Equilibrium 
Price Dispersion with Identical Agents, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1121, 1121 (1982) (noting 
where “information is costly to gather . . . [and] individuals may not be perfectly 
informed about the prices (or qualities) of what is being sold . . . the law of the 
single price does not obtain”). 
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segments of consumers as on any abstract demand curve.17 Most 
important to antitrust analysis, strategic decisions by dominant 
sellers themselves can shape the multiple equilibria prices in ways 
that can further entrench their dominance.18 
Other scholars have argued that the original intent of antitrust 
was not to act as a meta-consumer protection law simply policing an 
ideal market, but was focused more specifically on challenging the 
wealth transfers from the public to monopolists and oligopolists. 
“Congress passed the antitrust laws to further economic objectives, 
but primarily objectives of a distributive rather than of an efficiency 
nature,” writes Robert Lande, “[i]n other words, Congress was 
concerned principally with preventing ‘unfair’ transfers of wealth 
from consumers to firms with market power.”19 In the case of 
search advertising, this article will illustrate how “unfair” can be 
understood operationally in this case in terms of a dominant search 
advertising company exploiting consumer ignorance through data 
mining to enrich both itself and its advertisers at consumer 
expense. 
II. THE FAILURE OF THE GOOGLE “MARKET” FOR USER DATA 
Most defenders of Google argue that users engage in a rational 
market exchange. In exchange for providing some personal data to 
Google, those users get access to a valuable service.20 However, 
 
 17.  Id. at 1122–23 (“[I]f firms have access to devices . . . which allow the firm 
to differentiate between different groups in the population . . . and, if it is costly to 
enter the market, no equilibrium exists.”); Steven Salop, The Noisy Monopolist: 
Imperfect Information, Price Dispersion and Price Discrimination, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 
393, 393 (1977) (“[Cost] dispersion acts as a costly device for sorting consumers 
into submarkets to permit price discrimination.”); see Rosa-Branca Esteves & Joana 
Resende, Competitive Targeted Advertising with Price Discrimination (Universidade do 
Minho Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas, Working Paper No. 08, 
2011), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/nip/nipewp/08-2011.html (discussed 
infra in Part III). 
 18.  J. Stiglitz & A. Weiss, Alternative Approaches to Analyzing Markets with 
Asymmetric Information: Reply, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 246, 246–49 (1983). 
 19.  Robert Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of 
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 68 (1982); see 
also Louis B. Schwartz, “Justice” and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1076, 1078 (1979) (stating that American imposition of antitrust measures 
in post-war Japan and Germany was a political move to shift power). 
 20.  Robert Bork, Antitrust and Google, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 6, 2012, at 19, available 
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assuming that the market is functioning in such a case requires 
(1) that those users properly value the benefits they receive from 
Google, (2) that they properly price their personal information and 
the opportunity cost of giving it up, and (3) that there are no 
economic byproducts of Google’s monopoly control of user data 
that reduce consumer welfare more generally. As this section will 
detail, there is strong evidence that users do not properly calculate 
any of those three factors in the exchange with Google, leading to 
large costs to the public from Google’s dominance. 
Without viable alternatives to Google, you end up with a 
stunted “market” for valuing user privacy, so Google feels less and 
less compunction about violating personal privacy to benefit its 
advertising customers. While scholars like Frank Pasquale have 
noted the danger of analyzing loss of privacy and other harms from 
Google in just economic terms since that misses many of its non-
economic harms,21 those clear economic harms merit antitrust 
 
at 2012 WLNR 7311753 (“No agency or critic has articulated a coherent theory of 
how Google harms consumers. . . . Search algorithms speed to consumers what 
they most likely want and direct advertisers to consumers most likely to want to buy 
from them.”). Geoffrey Manne and Joshua Wright argue that search advertising is 
just like any form of advertising, where the goal is to help consumers find 
advertising for products that might interest them. Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. 
Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case Against the Case Against Google, 
34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 222 (2011) (“[A]ll forms of advertising—and 
related endeavors like store placement and design—are about bringing buyers and 
sellers together by minimizing some of the transaction costs that otherwise keep 
them apart.”); see also Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis of Marketing, 2006 WIS. L. 
REV. 1151, 1162–64 (providing a formulaic approach to evaluating consumer 
utility derived from marketing exposure). 
 21.  Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified 
Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 143 (2010) 
(“Engaging in a cost-benefit analysis diminishes privacy’s status as a right.”); see also 
C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REV. 839, 
857 (2002) (noting antirust largely ignores loss to public from monopoly “power 
over the content available for consumer choice”). Pasquale also details many non-
economic harms from Google’s search monopoly, from mistaken same-name 
reputational harms to unearthing credit reports or expunged records. Pasquale, 
supra, at 114. Siva Vaidhyanathan also analyzes a wide range of non-economic 
harms of Google’s concentrated dominance as well. See generally SIVA 
VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING (AND WHY WE SHOULD WORRY) 
(2011). 
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action even if other regulatory actions or legislation may be needed 
to address the full gamut of privacy losses.22 
The deeper harm to consumers from Google’s power in the 
market—and one that is at the heart of the increasing economic 
inequality in our society—is the way Google’s profiling of its users 
for advertisers allows the kind of predatory marketing we saw in the 
subprime housing bubble globally and in a range of other sectors. 
Online profiling based on user data allows seedier companies, from 
subprime mortgage lenders to payday lenders, to target the most 
naïve and vulnerable potential consumers and facilitate new forms 
of price discrimination even by more legitimate firms that allow 
those companies to extract the highest potential price for goods 
and services from each customer.23 The result is harm to those 
victimized consumers and is a likely explanation for the more 
pervasive increase in economic inequality.24 
A. Users Overestimate the Value Added by Google’s Services and Do Not 
Receive the Full Economic Value of the Data They Share with Google 
Without discounting the value added by Google’s aggregation 
services in search and a range of its other products, a basic truth is 
that most of the value delivered by Google is access to other 
peoples’ labor and knowledge, most of which Google accesses for 
free itself. With Google seeming to be the gateway to the Internet 
itself, whether in search, YouTube videos, or Android apps, its value 
can seem literally incalculable. 
Media studies professor Clay Shirky details in Cognitive Surplus 
how profound a shift in our models of production and markets is 
underway in a world where people can access the fruits of not only 
commercial production but, even more dramatically, “user 
generated content” created outside any traditional marketplace.25 
 
 22.  See Frank Pasquale and Oren Bracha, who have promoted just such an 
alternative regulatory approach to address such non-antitrust concerns about a 
search monopoly in Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in 
the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149 (2008). 
 23.  See infra Parts III, V. 
 24.  See infra Part VI. 
 25.  CLAY SHIRKY, COGNITIVE SURPLUS: CREATIVITY AND GENEROSITY IN A 
CONNECTED AGE 27 (2010) (“[T]he wiring of humanity lets us treat free time as a 
shared global resource, and lets us design new kinds of participation and sharing 
that take advantage of that resource.”). 
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Where home production has been largely marginal in modern 
society, the Internet suddenly makes “free time” incredibly valuable 
when aggregated, yet returns little of that value to those producers. 
Companies like Google take advantage of this peer production in 
ways writer Nicholas Carr has referred to as “digital sharecropping,” 
where the Internet “provides an incredibly efficient mechanism to 
harvest the economic value of the free labor provided by the very 
many and concentrate it into the hands of the very few.”26 
The incredibly outsized stock valuations of web-based firms 
such as Amazon (with its user-generated product reviews), 
Facebook (with its user-generated content and social links), and 
Google (with its ability to search for others’ content, user-
generated YouTube videos, etc.) can best be understood in terms 
of the cognitive surplus each is harvesting.27 It is one way to explain 
how Google can have a stock market capitalization roughly the 
same as AT&T, while employing one-fifth as many employees.28 
While such social media companies provide a service, they are in 
fact using what is a relatively small investment to leverage the value 
of others’ free labor by becoming the gateway for users to other 
online user’s content.29 Given that its content largely comes from 
other people and companies and is delivered over the common 
Internet system, this is one argument for applying common-carrier 
rules to the company and the right of the public for regulations 
 
 26.  Nicholas Carr, Sharecropping the Long Tail, ROUGH TYPE (Dec. 19, 2006, 
8:55 AM), http://www.roughtype.com/?p=634; see also VAIDHYANATHAN, supra 
note 21, at 30 (“Google is taking a free ride on the creative content of billions of 
content creators.”). 
 27.  Conversely, when the free contributions to a social network dry up, a 
once highly-valued company can become nearly worthless. The social news site 
Digg, for example, was valued at one point at $160 million, but was sold for 
$500,000 in 2012 as its community of users contributing content “started to drift 
away in early 2010.” See Joseph Walker & Spenser Ante, Once a Social Media Star, 
Digg Sells for $500,000, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2012, at B3, available at LEXIS. 
 28.  See Nathan Newman, Job Creation Will Come from the Wires, Not the 
Software of Broadband Internet, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 10, 2011, 3:30 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-newman/corporate-outsourcing-jobs_b 
_1005269.html. 
 29.  VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 21, at 16 (detailing how Google gained its 
dominance because it delivers “video and text to users, even if much of that 
content is hosted on other institutions’ sites”). 
10
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ensuring fair and equitable access to the content that Google is 
leveraging itself for free.30 
Google’s innovation in search technology was, in fact, built 
around harvesting the diffuse labor of people across the Internet. 
Its original PageRank algorithm used the links to other websites 
created by website creators across the Internet as a tool to assess 
and rank the likely value of websites containing similar information 
or keywords.31 This system of highly ranking websites valued by 
other users has been enhanced by also measuring what sites 
Google’s own users click on when they make a particular search.32 
Each click adds to the algorithm that can direct users with similar 
searches and interests to see the same link become highly ranked 
when they make a search as well. The more people find and use 
other people’s content via Google, the better Google’s algorithm 
becomes, reinforcing the precision and strength of its search 
engine vis-à-vis any challenger search technology, which would lack 
access to the network of users and the information they generate 
on search preferences.33 Other Google services such as YouTube or 
Gmail play out much the same dynamic, with users gaining 
important technological advantages from using Google but 
ultimately getting greater value from the labor of other users, 
thereby confusing any simple economic valuation of what Google is 
providing. This also apparently confuses many analysts who 
attribute greater innovation to Google when its search quality 
advantages are in fact due to the monopoly dominance that gives it 
such a disproportionate share of user data. 
What Google, Facebook, and other online gateways are 
tapping is a psychological drive to share with others that is quite 
distinct from the simple self-interested economic market models 
most economists depend upon for understanding how value in 
both production and consumption is measured and where the 
motivation for its creation is derived.34 To encourage its users to 
 
 30.  See Newman, supra note 8, (manuscript at 68–69). 
 31.  VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 21, at 21. 
 32.  See James Grimmelmann, The Google Dilemma, 53 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 939, 
941–42 (2008/09); Pasquale, supra note 21, at 116 n.50. 
 33.  See Pasquale, supra note 21, at 116 n.50. 
 34.  Scholars Yochai Benkler and Helen Nissenbaum have described how 
“common-based peer production” systems tap a whole complex of social desires 
for autonomy and competence whose rewards are more related to social 
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share content freely on its services, Google has publicly adopted 
multiple markers of peer-based production. Most famously, Google 
adopted in its early mission statement that it would “make money 
without doing evil,”35 or more simply, “don’t be evil” as stated in the 
first words of Google’s code of conduct.36 Combined with ostensibly 
providing its own free content to users, this mantra was a clear 
signal to users that the company was “one of them” in promoting 
shared value through collaboration.37 However, Google could seem 
to be acting in a collaborative way with its users because its key 
advertising revenue source was based on collecting—and not 
sharing—intimate user data from those “collaborators.” 
B. Users Undervalue the Economic Value of the Data They Share with 
Google 
If users attribute too much of the value they gain from 
accessing online content to Google, they also clearly underestimate 
the economic value of the personal data they share with Google in 
exchange for accessing its services. Because there is no price paid 
for the data by Google, or paid by users for the Google products 
those users use, the result is a zero price barter exchange. As David 
Evans notes, this results in “conundrums and confusion in antitrust 
analysis” since gains or losses on price, quality, and other factors for 
users in a zero price exchange are disguised.38 Standard antitrust 
analysis loses the price measure for evaluating such issues, since, as 
Evans highlights, “[five] percent of zero is still zero.”39 
On the face of it, the fact that Google is de facto involved in a 
barter relationship with its users—trading its tools for their 
 
relationships than traditional market forces. See generally Yochai Benkler & Helen 
Nissenbaum, Commons-Based Peer Production and Virtue, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 394 (2006). 
 35.  Ten Things We Know to Be True, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about 
/company/philosophy/ (last visited Dec. 8, 2013). 
 36.  Code of Conduct, GOOGLE, http://investor.google.com/corporate/code-of 
-conduct.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2013). 
 37.  See Jeffrey Van Camp, Is Google Still Worth Our Love, or Has It Become 
Another Selfish Corporation?, DIGITAL TRENDS (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www 
.digitaltrends.com/opinion/is-google-still-worth-our-love-or-has-it-become-another 
-selfish-corporation. 
 38.  David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Free, 7 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 
71, 72 (2011). 
 39.  Id. 
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individual private information—is a pretty clear indication that 
users are unlikely to be getting the full market value of their data—
and means that analyzing the situation in terms of economic 
models of market exchange makes little sense.40 Like most barter 
economies, pricing is opaque and creates massive opportunities for 
economic arbitrage by the sophisticated side of the barter 
transaction—i.e., Google. Essentially Google users are the primitive 
tribes of the Internet, accepting the shiny trinkets of Gmail and 
free search in exchange for their privacy. As anthropologists will 
attest about such primitive systems of nonmarket exchange, they 
can be dynamic and productive in ways market economies may not 
be in certain situations,41 just as writers like Clay Shirky, Yochai 
Benkler, and Helen Nissenbaum describe how modern 
collaborative “peer production” online can be wildly productive.42 
But what is true is that the interaction of the market with such 
nonmarket systems is a recipe for economic exploitation.43 
A large part of the problem is that multiple studies show most 
users do not even understand that their private data shared with 
online companies like Google are being shared with third parties to 
assist in marketing advertising.44 This largely reflects that sharing 
 
 40.  There is a rich anthropological tradition critiquing the reduction of 
nonmarket barter relationships to a simple market equivalence. Caroline 
Humphrey has written, “No example of a barter economy, pure and simple, has 
ever been described.” DAVID GRAEBER, DEBT: THE FIRST 5000 YEARS 29 (2011). 
 41.  See MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE IN 
ARCHAIC SOCIETIES (Ian Cunnison trans., 1966). 
 42.  SHIRKY, supra note 25, at 78–82; see also Benkler & Nissenbaum, supra note 
34, at 402. 
 43.  Karl Polanyi has been one of the foremost documenters of the historical 
disruptions where market and nonmarket systems have collided. See KARL POLANYI, 
THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944); KARL POLANYI, TRADE AND MARKET IN THE 
EARLY EMPIRES: ECONOMIES IN HISTORY AND THEORY (Karl Polanyi et al. eds., 1957); 
see also Paul Bohannan, The Impact of Money on an African Subsistence Economy, 19 J. 
ECON. HIST. 491, 491–503 (1959). 
 44.  PONNURANGAM KUMARAGURU & LORRIE FAITH CRANOR, PRIVACY INDEXES: 
A SURVEY OF WESTIN’S STUDIES 13 (2005), available at http://reports-archive.adm.cs 
.cmu.edu/anon/isri2005/CMU-ISRI-05-138.pdf (finding about half of Americans 
believe that “most businesses handle the personal information they collect about 
consumers in a proper and confidential way”); Jan Whittington & Chris Jay 
Hoofnagle, Social Networks and the Law: Unpacking Privacy’s Price, 90 N.C. L. REV. 
1327, 1357 (2012) (“American consumers profoundly misunderstand the rules 
underlying these transactions; they do not understand the terms of trade.”); 
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the data is a default when signing up with a service, with little 
information shared with users to educate them about the 
consequences of sharing their data. The massive amount of data 
being shared online does not reflect public preferences: a 2012 
Pew survey shows that seventy-three percent of the American public 
were opposed to search engines even tracking their search history 
to improve search results, and sixty-eight percent opposed use of 
user data to assist advertisers in targeting advertisements.45 But most 
of those users expressed no capacity to control what data is shared 
online.46 Other researchers found that desires to stop tracking, 
aggregating, and disseminating personal information have been 
increasing.47 Yet almost nowhere do defenders of Google factor in 
the costs to consumers of loss of privacy, yet as Peter Swire has 
noted, the nature of data aggregation is such that consumers with 
high privacy desires lose as data is concentrated in one company’s 
hands.48 
Notably, while dismissing the search bias antitrust claim 
against Google, Federal Trade Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch 
expressed concern that Google’s “monopoly or near-monopoly 
power in the search advertising market” derives from Google 
“telling ‘half-truths’—for example, that its gathering of information 
 
see Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us 
About Privacy?, in DIGITAL PRIVACY: THEORY, TECHNOLOGIES AND PRACTICES 363, 
363–64 (Alessandro Acquisti et al. eds., 2008) (stating that bounded rationality, 
optimism bias, and information asymmetry lead consumers to undervaluing 
personal information); Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jennifer King, Research Report: 
What Californians Understand About Privacy Offline 9–19 (May 15, 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id= 1133075. 
 45.  KRISTEN PURCELL ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., SEARCH ENGINE USE 2012, 
at 2 (2012), available at http://www.pewInternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports 
/2012/PIP_Search_Engine_Use_2012.pdf. 
 46.  Id. at 3 (“Just 38% of Internet users say they are generally aware of ways 
they themselves can limit how much information about them is collected by a 
website.”). 
 47.  Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Shifts in Privacy Concerns, 102 AM. 
ECON. REV. 349, 349 (2012) (explaining that millions of online decisions analyzed 
show a rising desire for privacy online). 
 48.  Peter P. Swire, Submitted Testimony to the Federal Trade Commission for 
Behavioral Advertising Town Hall, EUR. PARLIAMENT 4 (Oct. 18, 2007), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/testimony
_peterswire_/Testimony_peterswire_en.pdf (written testimony of Peter Swire). 
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about the characteristics of a consumer is done solely for the 
consumer’s benefit, instead of also to maintain a monopoly or 
near-monopoly position.”49 He cited precedent that a company’s 
claims to be acting on behalf of consumers while downplaying 
potential consumer harms not fully disclosed could create legal 
liability.50 
Google’s barter for user privacy may be opaque and primitive, 
but that contrasts sharply with the way the company monetizes that 
personal data to advertisers who pay very precise dollar terms in the 
modern part of the Google economy.51 And those advertisers pay 
prices far above the costs spent by Google on the tools provided to 
users—as highlighted by Google’s massive profits year after year.52 
That advertising side of Google’s internal economy is actually a 
monument to converting privacy into a modern currency, with 
sophisticated auctions for key words and phrases based on 
particular user demographics and backgrounds that the advertiser 
may be looking for.53 One analyst describes this has less to do with 
the sale of privacy itself by Google, but rather the sale of a “privacy 
derivative,” where companies invest in Google’s appraisal of 
customers’ needs and wants.54 
C. Why Aren’t Users Paid for Their Data? 
Some Google defenders ask, what could be better for 
consumers than getting all of Google’s services free? This is part of 
 
 49.  Rosch’s Statement, supra note 7, at 1 n.1. 
 50.  Id. (citing N. Am. Philips Corp., 111 F.T.C. 139, 188 (1988) (initial 
decision) (arguing that half-truths can be deceptive); Int’l Harvester Co., 104 
F.T.C. 949, 1057 (1984) (“[I]t can be deceptive to tell only half the truth, and to 
omit the rest.”)). 
 51.  Hal Varian, How Auctions Set Ad Prices, GOOGLE BLOG (May 12, 2008), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/05/how-auctions-set-ad-prices.html. 
 52.  Google reported annual revenue of $50 billion in 2012—a thirty-two 
percent increase from a year earlier––with annualized profits of over $14 billion 
per year. Casey Newton, Google Revenue Hits $14.42B in Fourth Quarter, Up 
36 Percent, CNET (Jan. 22, 2013, 1:10 PM PST), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023 
_3-57565236-93/google-revenue-hits-$14.42b-in-fourth-quarter-up-36-percent/. 
 53.  Reach People Interested in Your Products or Services, GOOGLE SUPPORT, 
https://support.google.com/adwords/answer/2497941?hl=en (last visited Dec. 
25, 2013); Varian, supra note 51. 
 54.  Karl T. Muth, Googlestroika: Privatizing Privacy, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 337, 343 
(2009). For further discussion on how Google monetizes user privacy, see id. 
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obscuring the economic value of personal data, much as early bank 
customers might not have expected more of banks than protecting 
their money in a vault for free until competitors began offering to 
pay them interest on that money deposited and offering rewards to 
customers using their credit cards. Economists regularly note that 
in two-sided markets where commercial interests, such as credit 
card companies, want a large base of users of a product, users on 
one side of the transaction are regularly paid to adopt the 
product.55 Just as banks leverage deposits to make money lending it 
out, Google makes money off of personal data deposited with 
them––yet a legal question is, why don’t most Google users get a 
cut of the money Google makes off of their data? 
Along with the general ignorance discussed above, Google 
thrives on the expectations of freely shared, online “peer 
production,” which, as media professor Clay Shirky highlights, has 
a whole value system eschewing expectation of any precise quid pro 
quo exchange of value.56 Based on research that shows more 
voluntary activity when payment is not involved,57 Google’s quasi-
barter relationship with its users may potentially be eliciting more 
free content and information from its users than if it actually paid 
them for it. 
With all this, the first step in the transfer of wealth via Google 
is from users selling their privacy for too little and Google 
arbitraging user ignorance and their psychological mode of 
collaboration over market exchange for profit. This is the product 
of Google largely having the field to itself without serious 
competitive pressure to actually offer users the real value of their 
data. Competitors have tried to introduce models where users get a 
cut of the advertising revenue generated,58 but with Bing losing 
 
 55.  See, e.g., Marc Rysman, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 23 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 125, 129 (2009). 
 56.  See SHIRKY, supra note 25, at 131–59. See generally Benkler & Nissenbaum, 
supra note 34, at 394. 
 57.  See Bruno S. Frey & Lorenz Goette, Does Pay Motivate Volunteers? (Univ. of 
Zurich Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 7, 1999), 
available at http://ideas.repec.org/s/zur/iewwpx.html (offering money depressed 
the number of hours of labor the average volunteer contributed). 
 58.  Boaz Berkowitz, Cha-Ching: Microsoft Pays Users to Search with Bing, SEEKING 
ALPHA (Aug. 10, 2009, 1:16 PM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/155148-cha 
-ching-microsoft-pays-users-to-search-with-bing; Robin Harris, Microsoft Stops Paying 
Us to Use Bing, ZDNET (June 6, 2010, 11:14 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog 
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$2.5 billion per year already,59 it’s hardly surprising few companies 
have moved very far in the direction of further increasing their 
losses. 
The result is that there is then little pressure on Google to 
offer anything to users out of its quite substantial profits from 
marketing user data to advertisers. Google did begin a small pilot 
program in 2012 called Google Search Screenwise that offers 
twenty-five dollars per year to a select set of people using the 
Chrome browser, although the numbers were limited and Google 
framed the plan not as a general reimbursement of users for using 
their data but merely a market research survey.60 So Google can dip 
its toe into paying a few users for even deeper revelations of their 
private activity while encouraging the vast majority of its users to 
continue thinking of participation in its services and sharing their 
data in nonmarket terms. 
However, if Google had less dominance of the online 
advertising field, there would be far greater pressure for Google to 
develop as sophisticated a market for users to be compensated for 
their privacy as the precision of the markets in which it resells that 
lost privacy to advertisers.61 
III. WHY USER DATA IS SO USEFUL TO ADVERTISERS: “PAIN POINTS” 
AND THE CONSUMER HARM OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION FACILITATED 
BY A MONOPOLY PLAYER LIKE GOOGLE 
Clearly, given Google’s advertising profits,62 the user data the 
company collects is incredibly valuable and a number of analysts 
have put a price on what that data is worth for each individual user. 
For example, Michael Fertik, CEO of the company 
Reputation.com, a service to help consumers keep their personal 
information anonymous online, estimates that data can be worth 
up to $5000 per person per year to advertisers, depending on how 
 
/storage/microsoft-stops-paying-us-to-use-bing/960. 
 59.  Robert Cyran, Microsoft Ought to Kick off Search for Bing Buyer, REUTERS 
(July 22, 2011, 4:01 PM), available at Westlaw. 
 60.  Jeff Bertolucci, Google Search’s Screenwise vs. Bing Rewards: Which Pays 
More?, PCWORLD (Feb 9, 2012, 2:27 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article 
/249683/google_searchs_screenwise_vs_bing_rewards_which_pays_more_.html. 
 61.  See Rysman, supra note 55, at 131 (noting how competition in credit card 
payment systems has increased rewards payment to consumers). 
 62.  See Newton, supra note 52. 
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much those users spend and how the data is used by online 
companies like Google.63 McKinsey has estimated that data mining 
broadly can increase operating margins by sixty percent for 
companies.64 
To get some sense of the value of user information, look at the 
recent controversy over another big Internet player, namely Apple, 
when it demanded that sellers of subscriptions to apps on the 
iPhone give them not just thirty percent of sales, but sole control of 
user information as well.65 Analyst Lauren Idvik noted that 
publishers like the Financial Times may not have liked the thirty 
percent cut Apple wanted from subscriptions, but “the main 
problem is that Apple will not share subscriber data with 
publishers, long one of publishers’ most valuable assets, particularly 
to advertisers.”66 That the personal data, not the thirty percent cut, 
was the real sticking point in negotiations indicates that personal 
information is worth potentially more than thirty percent of the 
cost of what you purchase online, yet most users give it away for 
free to companies like Google and Apple. 
As discussed further in the remedies section, any governmental 
action that strengthens user privacy rights, such as requiring an 
opt-in agreement for each specific use of their data by anyone 
collecting the information, would both reduce the amount of 
personal data being extracted and create a potential “friction” 
point where Google and other related data miners might feel 
compelled to pay users at least part of what that data is worth to 
convince them to share their private data, as well as guarantee 
better security for that data. 
 
 63.  Quentin Fottrell, Who Would Pay $5,000 to Use Google? (You), MARKET 
WATCH (Jan. 25, 2012, 12:24 PM), http://blogs.smartmoney.com/advice/2012/01 
/25/who-would-pay-5000-to-use-google-you/ (“‘Their entire market cap is related 
to how much data is being collected and used,’ says Jules Polonetsky, director of 
the Future of Privacy Forum, a Washington, D.C.-based think-tank.”). 
 64.  JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXT 
FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY 2 (2011), 
available at http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/big_data 
_the_next_frontier_for_innovation. 
 65.  Lauren Indvik, Financial Times Refuses to Give up Subscriber Data to Apple, 
MASHABLE (Apr. 4, 2011), http://mashable.com/2011/04/04/financial-times 
-subscriptions-apple/. 
 66.  Id. 
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That initial loss by users of giving their private information 
away too cheaply is just the start of the consumer harm from 
Google’s dominance of the online advertising marketplace and its 
control of user data. The deeper potential harm, as will be 
discussed below, stems from the reason companies pay Google such 
a premium for that data in serving up advertisements to them 
based on that personal information. 
The most positive spin on this use of user data for targeting 
ads is that it helps those companies find the customers interested in 
their products—and that’s part of the story. But it’s not just finding 
customers; it’s finding out what price different groups of customers 
will pay for the same product or service and marketing it separately 
to them at those different prices. 
The darker version of online marketing is that it can facilitate 
what economists call “price discrimination,” selling the same exact 
good at a variety of prices,67 often in ways unknown to the buyers. 
This is based on the reality that people have different maximum 
prices that they are willing to pay, a so-called “pain point” after 
which they won’t buy the product.68 The ideal for a seller would be 
to sell a product to each customer at their individual “pain point” 
price without them knowing that any other deal is available. In 
general, economists believe that where consumers do know all the 
pricing options, they can potentially benefit from price 
discrimination.69 The classic example is airline pricing, where 
consumers willing to book ahead and take only certain flights get a 
lower price, while more well-off or time-sensitive consumers will pay 
 
 67.  Price Discrimination, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com 
/dictionary/price%20discrimination (last visited Jan. 30, 2014) (“the offering of 
similar or identical goods at different prices to different buyers”). 
 68.  IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS: WHY THINKING-BY-NUMBERS IS THE NEW WAY 
TO BE SMART 190 (2007) (analyzing ways firms use data mining to set 
individualized coupon discounts even at traditional stores and noting “[firms] are 
becoming more adept at figuring out how much pricing pain individual 
consumers are willing to endure and still come back for more”). 
 69.  For a general survey of the literature, see WILLIAM W. FISHER III 
& TALHA SYED, INFECTION: THE HEALTH CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT (forthcoming) (manuscript at ch. 6), 
available at https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/Infection.htm (“[P]rice 
discrimination almost always benefits manufacturers. Sometimes it also benefits 
society at large; sometimes not.”). See generally Hal Varian, Price Discrimination and 
Social Welfare, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 870 (1985). 
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more for the same seat to book at the last minute for a specific 
flight. This arguably fills seats, increases revenues for the airline, 
and gives some people access to cheaper seats that might not be 
available at all at the lower price without price discrimination.70 
The problem arises when consumers don’t have all needed 
information. As economist Joseph Stiglitz describes, “the presence 
of information imperfections give rise to market power in product 
markets. Firms can exploit this market power through ‘sales’ and 
other ways of differentiating among individuals who have different 
search costs.”71 
With public advertising, a customer willing to pay a higher 
price will generally demand the lower price advertised to someone 
else, although they may not notice the alternative ad, creating some 
imperfections in the marketplace. However, data mining and 
targeted Internet advertising allows sellers to make different 
advertising offers to particular groups of consumers based on 
correlations derived from past behavior or user location that are 
essentially invisible to anyone charged a higher price or missing out 
on a coupon. A 2012 Wall Street Journal report found that major 
companies, including Staples, Home Depot, Discover Financial 
Services, and Rosetta Stone, were systematically using information 
on user physical locations to display different online prices to 
different customers.72 And contrary to the hope that such price 
discrimination might benefit low-income bargain hunters, the Wall 
Street Journal found that “areas that tended to see the discounted 
prices had a higher average income than areas that tended to see 
higher prices,” largely on the assumption that poor areas have 
 
 70.  John Lazarev, The Welfare Effects of Intertemporal Price Discrimination: 
An Empirical Analysis of Airline Pricing in U.S. Monopoly Markets 4–5 (Jan. 7, 
2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://files.nyu.edu/jl5214/public 
/Lazarev_JMP.pdf. 
 71.  Stiglitz, supra note 13, at 470; see also Salop, supra note 17, at 393–406; 
Steven Salop & Joseph Stiglitz, Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically 
Competitive Price Dispersion, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 493 (1977), reprinted in 1 THE 
ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION 198 (David K Levine & Steven A. Lippmann eds., 
1995); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The 
Insurance Market, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 407, 407–30 (1977). 
 72.  Jennifer Valentino-Devries et al., Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on Users’ 
Information, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2012, at A1, available at LEXIS. 
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fewer retail options locally so a higher price can be extracted from 
them by online retailers.73 
In the case of search advertising, the New York Times in 2010 
profiled how web coupons are deployed to target offers based on 
user behavior, including with different coupon offers being made 
based on different search terms on Google. As Ed Mierzwinski, 
consumer program director for the United States Public Interest 
Research Group (USPIRG) noted in a New York Times interview, 
companies “offer you, perhaps, less desirable products than they 
offer me, or offer you the same product as they offer me but at a 
higher price.”74 USPIRG has asked the Federal Trade Commission 
for tighter rules on all online advertising precisely because of this 
problem.75 In his book Super Crunchers, Ian Ayers describes how data 
mining and selective discount offers to individuals is making prices 
increasingly opaque to consumers.76 Offering only full-price offers 
to some online buyers while selectively offering discounts to others 
based on online profiling is one of the most pervasive forms of 
price discrimination operating in online sales.77 
Despite hopes that online commerce would create greater 
consumer empowerment to engage in price comparisons, such 
hidden price discrimination frustrates that hope and adds to the 
shifting of power in overall online bargaining to sellers. Firms have 
also invested in a range of online strategies, from mandatory add-
ons to multiple versions of a product to deliberately complicated 
descriptions designed to frustrate simple price comparisons 
between sites. Glenn and Sara Fisher Ellison have detailed these 
“price obfuscation” strategies and found they can regularly lead to 
far higher markups, even for commodity technology goods like 
memory modules, than would be expected in a more frictionless 
 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Stephanie Clifford, Coupons from Internet Know a Lot About You, and They 
Tell, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 7964510. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  AYERS, supra note 68, at 190 (“[Retail stores] can print out tailored 
coupons with prices just for you. . . . In a world of Super Crunching, it’s going to 
be a lot harder to rely on other consumers to keep your price in line.”). 
 77.  Natasha Singer, You for Sale: Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2012), 2012 WLNR 12625198 (“Acxiom . . . assigns consumers 
to one of 70 detailed socioeconomic clusters and markets to them accordingly. . . . 
[with sellers making] customized appeals anytime, anywhere.”). 
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market. For example, where the Ellisons argue a markup of three 
percent to six percent would be expected for commodity products 
like memory modules, they found markups of twelve percent on 
average.78 
This all undercuts any model of online commerce that 
resembles the neoclassical ideal of a single equilibrium price for 
goods. Instead it far more reflects the information economics 
model of high search costs and variations in consumer rationality 
being used by firms to create a dispersion of prices. This allows 
firms to evaluate those search costs for different consumers and set 
prices in ways that extract the maximum revenue from each 
transaction.79 A key point from evaluating consumer welfare is that 
despite any advertised “bargains” or sales, overall prices in such a 
regime of obscured prices and seller price discrimination end up 
higher than any model of competitive prices where all price 
information was openly known and advertised.80 Where such price 
dispersion and obscured information exists, firms have a quasi-
monopolistic power to set prices which, as Steven Salop and Joseph 
Stiglitz outline, “they would be unable to do in a competitive 
market with perfect [price] information.”81 
The Economics of Price Discrimination in Google’s Business Plan 
The question is how central facilitating such price 
discrimination is to Google’s business model. Given that Google 
appointed Hal Varian, who has written extensively about price 
discrimination in online advertising for decades,82 to be the 
company’s Chief Economist in 2005, the answer seems to be that 
it’s likely quite central to their model. 
That same year, Varian outlined the advantages to advertisers 
of online marketing and price discrimination in a piece he 
coauthored for the journal Marketing Science that echoed many of 
 
 78.  Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, Search, Obfuscation, and Price 
Elasticities on the Internet, 77 ECONOMETRICA 427, 427–29 (2009) (“Obfuscation can 
be thought of as an action that raises search costs, which can lead to less consumer 
learning and higher profits.”). 
 79.  Salop & Stiglitz, supra note 71, at 493–96. 
 80.  Id. at 502. 
 81.  Id. at 509. 
 82.  Hal Varian’s writing on price discrimination dates back at least to 1980 in 
his paper, Hal R. Varian, A Theory of Sales, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 651 (1980). 
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the basic insights of information economics in the context of 
online sales.83 Varian, Google’s Chief Economist, highlights the 
failure of most price discrimination to yield profits in traditional 
marketing because of the visibility of different prices to most 
customers, but that “significant initial investments in information 
technology can lead to competitive advantages” that lock in user 
loyalty while collecting personal information to make price 
discrimination profitable.84 As he describes: 
Because so many transactions are now computer 
mediated, and these computers can easily be networked to 
data centers, sellers now have the ability to access 
databases of past purchases in real time. This allows them 
to condition current offers to consumers on their previous 
purchase behavior. Sellers can offer each individual a 
different price, a particular prize or coupon, or 
personalized recommendations. With computer-mediated 
transactions, price discrimination on an individual basis 
becomes quite feasible.85 
Varian notes that differential pricing will be most effective on the 
“fraction of the potential population [that] is myopic and ignores 
the impact of their current behavior on future offerings” and how 
undermining the ability of users to make their behavior anonymous 
increases the costs to users of evading price discrimination— 
a point he hits repeatedly in the piece and a good explanation of 
Google’s focus on obliterating anonymous browsing online.86 
By locking users in to particular services, building loyalty (or 
just making it a chore to log in or out of the online service), and 
designing a “selling platform with the goal of making the adoption 
of defensive technologies prohibitively costly for the consumer,”87 
companies will increase their profits at the expense of their 
customers, particularly the “myopic” ones, even under competitive 
markets. 
While Varian’s example in 2005 was clearly about Amazon, the 
measures he focused on—user lock-in, integrated user profiles, 
 
 83.  Alessandro Acquisti & Hal R. Varian, Conditioning Prices on Purchase 
History, 24 MARKETING SCI. 367 (2005). 
 84.  Id. at 380. 
 85.  Id. at 367. 
 86.  Id. at 380. 
 87.  Id. at 374. 
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defeating anonymity—describe exactly the systematic deployment 
of products and systems Google has pursued as well. As early as 
2004, Google was applying for patents on how to sell advertising 
based on such behavioral and demographic tracking, where one 
patent specified, “advertisements are personalized in response to a 
search profile that is derived from personalized search results.”88 
Since 2009, Google has been rolling out beta tests of such 
behavioral profiling for advertisers and in 2011 fully implemented 
its coordination of advertising with targeting demographic groups 
identified by Google based on user browsing activity, behavior, and 
physical location.89 So companies working with Google can more 
and more effectively segment the market by demographic profiles 
yielding the “myopic” customers who will pay the maximum price 
based on their demographic and behavioral characteristics.90 
Varian’s analysis focuses on a number of scenarios where 
sellers use price discrimination to increase overall sales. In many, 
any overall economic value added in the economy “is entirely due 
to the increased profit received by the seller,”91 while in a number 
of other scenarios outlined by Varian, consumer welfare as a whole 
actually falls. Even if economic efficiency overall strengthened in 
some scenarios, the fact that those gains include a large loss for 
some or, in many cases, all consumers to the advantage of sellers 
emphasizes that the argument that technology increases overall 
“consumer welfare” means little if all of the increased economic 
growth goes only to sellers at the expense of actual consumers. 
Courts and many scholarly analysts have emphasized that the 
 
 88.  U.S. Patent Application No. 10/877775 (filed June 24, 2004), 
available at http://appft1.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.html (search for 
“20050222989”). 
 89.  Pamela Parker, Google Rolls Out Behavioral Targeting to All AdWords 
Advertisers, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (June 23, 2011, 6:09 PM), http://searchengine 
land.com/google-rolls-out-behavioral-targeting-to-all-adwords-advertisers-82976. 
 90.  See Ahmadali Arabshahi, Google’s Groupon Strategy: Algorithmic Price-
Sensitivity Quotients, AHMADALI’S BLOG (Jan. 17, 2011), http://www.ahmadalia.com 
/blog/2011/01/google-groupon-strategy.html (detailing how such behavioral 
tracking can work for Google in creating a profile for advertisers that helps 
identify price-sensitive versus price-insensitive customers). Arabshahi sees Google’s 
launch into Groupon-like offers working with local businesses as a way for Google 
to better monetize its data on its users. Id. 
 91.  Acquisti & Varian, supra note 83, at 372. 
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Sherman Act92 is not an economic efficiency maximization statute 
and that productivity gains from monopoly-maintaining inno-
vations that benefit sellers at the expense of consumers still 
constitute a violation of antitrust law.93 
Rosa-Branca Esteves and Joana Resende in more recent 
research highlight the ways that, because of the low costs of online 
advertising,94 such online price discrimination can reduce 
consumer surplus to the advantage of corporate profits.95 They 
emphasize that models of price discrimination that benefit 
consumers are based on the assumption that consumers are 
perfectly informed of all available prices, but with imperfect 
consumer information and targeted advertising, models shift 
towards price discrimination benefiting company profits at the 
expense of consumers.96 One implication of their models is that 
“average prices with mass advertising (nondiscrimination) are 
below those with targeted advertising,” which follows the idea that 
firms will target certain consumers with promotions while enjoying 
higher prices paid by Varian’s “myopic” consumers unaware of 
discounts offered to others.97 
 
 92.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). 
 93.  See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 
549 U.S. 312, 323 (2007); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 
(1984), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); 
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979); Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled 
Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 
435–36 (2009) (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 
(1984)). 
 94.  See generally Esteves & Resende, supra note 17. Esteves and Resende 
contrast their results when low advertising costs are assumed with disputed studies 
over whether, in cases of more costly conventional advertising, targeted advertising 
increases profits. Id. Compare Nada Ben Elhadj-Ben Brahim et al., Is Targeted 
Advertising Always Beneficial?, 29 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 678, 685 (2011) (“When the 
advertising cost is high, targeting reduces firms’ profits relative to random 
advertising.”), with Ganesh Iyer et al., The Targeting of Advertising, 24 MARKETING 
SCI. 461, 461 (2005) (“[T]he targeting of advertising increases equilibrium 
profits.”). 
 95.  Esteves & Resende, supra note 18, at 1 (“[P]rice discrimination through 
targeted advertising may be detrimental to social welfare since it boosts industry 
profits at the expense of consumer surplus.”). 
 96.  Id. at 6–7. 
 97.  Id. at 28. 
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IV. THE CASE FOR LEGAL ACTION ON CONSUMER HARM FROM PRICE 
DISCRIMINATION 
With so much of seller profit from price discrimination online 
derived from exploitation of “myopic” customers failing to know 
about or find cheaper alternatives to the prices offered them,98 a 
number of antitrust theorists who focus on allocative efficiency 
argue price discrimination is one category of consumer harm that 
demands legal action. 
In his article Unconscionability and Price Discrimination,99 Mark 
Klock, while accepting most traditional Chicago School skepticism 
of government regulation in the marketplace, argues that any 
situation where one set of consumers is unknowingly paying more 
for the same product than others is a clear sign of a failure in the 
marketplace that calls for government intervention. He is skeptical 
of hypothetical cases of consumer gain from price discrimination100 
and argues, “[a] sound policy would prohibit firms from charging 
different prices based solely on the identity of the customer.”101 
Echoing the studies discussed above, Klock and others argue such 
price discrimination established under the aegis of a monopolist in 
the marketplace is even more harmful to consumer welfare.102 
Douglas M. Kochelek has also highlighted that the rise of data 
mining online has made the problem of price discrimination far 
more pervasive in the economy, raising the importance of 
deploying antitrust as a curb on dominant players using it.103 
Given that Google’s control of user data to facilitate price 
discrimination is based at least partially on tying so many services 
that extract that data into its core search advertising product, it’s 
worth emphasizing that the Supreme Court has condemned 
traditional tying in many cases because it allowed companies to 
 
 98.  Acquisti & Varian, supra note 83, at 380. 
 99.  Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REV. 317 
(2002). 
 100.  See id. at 358 (dismissing the “empirically unsubstantiated case in which 
price discrimination achieves allocative efficiency”). 
 101.  Id. at 367. 
 102.  Id. at 329 (“Economists consider the price-discriminating monopolist to 
be very undesirable.”); Douglas M. Kochelek, Note, Data Mining and Antitrust, 
22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 515, 531 (2009) (“[D]ata mining technologies are able to 
facilitate price discrimination within a monopoly market.”). 
 103.  Kochelek, supra note 102, at 521. 
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identify different classes of consumers and, as stated in Jefferson 
Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, use that power “to impair 
competition . . . by facilitating price discrimination, thereby 
increasing monopoly profits over what they would be absent the 
tie.”104 
What’s unique about Google is that it can use its monopoly 
power not just to engage in price discrimination directly in regards 
to its advertising customers and potentially with users in its own 
e-commerce efforts, but also as a vehicle for companies across the 
economy to engage in such consumer harm via price 
discrimination, which should raise the priority for restraining its 
power in the marketplace. While firms would no doubt be taking 
advantage of targeted advertising to engage in price discrimination 
whatever the competitive nature of the search advertising industry, 
the lack of competition in the sector feeds the monopoly ability of 
Google to extract user data. A more developed market where users 
are more able to refuse to share their data combined with a more 
fractured set of players in the sector where no one player like 
Google would have so much data about all users would weaken the 
ability of advertisers to engage in price discrimination. 
Both Klock and Kochelek argue that, in the ideal, the explicit 
antitrust language in the Robinson-Patman Act105 on price 
discrimination should be a tool to address the problem.106 While 
the Robinson-Patman Act arguably does not address the harm of 
price discrimination to primary consumers,107 it does potentially 
 
 104.  466 U.S. 2, 14–15 (1984), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, 
Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006). For a general analysis of this line of cases, noting that 
courts disfavor the way tying facilitates price discrimination, see Elhauge, 
supra note 93, at 421–26. See also United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962), 
abrogated by Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 31; N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 
U.S. 1 (1958), superseded by statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)–(5) (2006); United Shoe 
Mach. Corp. v. United States, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 
332 U.S. 392 (1947), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 31–33. 
 105.  15 U.S.C. § 13 (2012). 
 106.  Klock, supra note 99, at 383 (“The treble damage framework of the 
Robinson-Patman Act with application to services and consumers would be a good 
start.”); Kochelek, supra note 102, at 524. Both Klock, supra note 99, at 330, and 
Kochelek, supra note 102, at 526, have doubts, however, that courts will accept 
their arguments. 
 107.  See FREDERICK M. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT 173 (1962) (arguing Robinson-Patman does not apply to consumer 
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address situations where the ability, which Google has, to facilitate 
price discrimination is a primary attribute strengthening its 
monopoly power vis-à-vis competitors.108 In any case, more general 
antitrust enforcement under the Sherman Act should be sufficient 
in cases of monopoly players wielding price discrimination and 
imposing the dead weight losses for consumer welfare discussed 
above.109 
V. SUBPRIME MORTGAGES, “AMBULANCE CHASERS AND SNAKE OIL 
SALESPEOPLE”: HOW ONLINE ADVERTISING UNLEASHES THE 
“TAWDRY” SIDE OF CAPITALISM 
How widespread the use of price discrimination and 
behavioral marketing is among legitimate businesses using Google 
to increase their profits at the expense of consumers is largely a 
matter for investigation by federal agencies, since Google quite 
obviously keeps such data closely held. There is of course wide-
ranging use of selectively offered promotions on websites 
throughout e-commerce promoted through Google search and 
display advertising, so that basic form of price discrimination is 
clearly in place. Evaluating the broad ways consumers are harmed 
by such selective price discrimination, a harm that even Google’s 
own Chief Economist admits is far more than a theoretical 
 
transactions). Kochelek largely dismisses the likelihood of using Robinson-Patman 
for this reason. Kochelek, supra note 102, at 525–26 (“Accordingly, the practice 
likely cannot be regulated under the primary-line theory of the Robinson-Patman 
Act.”). 
 108.  While Klock agrees that case law makes him skeptical of using Robinson-
Patman, he argues agencies and courts might broaden their interpretation of 
Robinson-Patman in light of the expansion of price discrimination in the 
marketplace. Klock, supra note 99, at 379. However, neither of the authors 
consider a case such as Google where the ability to engage in price discrimination 
is largely the basis of undermining the ability of competitors to enter the same 
market, so Robinson-Patman might be more applicable in this case. 
 109.  Kochelek, supra note 102, at 526 (“Regardless of the particular theory of 
the purpose of antitrust regulation one accepts, the economic effects of data-
mining-based price discrimination suggest that such conduct ought to be 
proscribed by the Sherman Act.”). However, Klock in particular thinks the 
potential enforcement threat of direct class action lawsuits by consumers wielding 
Robinson-Patman is a potentially better deterrence than depending on agency or 
competitor lawsuits against price discrimination under the Sherman Act. See Klock, 
supra note 99, at 377–78. 
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possibility,110 should be a primary focus for antitrust investigations 
into Google. 
However, while Google’s facilitation of price discrimination 
can increase profits for all businesses, targeted advertising has 
maximum appeal to the unethical and even illegal businesses 
seeking to prey on such “myopic” consumers that Google can help 
them identify. Early Internet visionary Jaron Lanier, who pioneered 
ideas like “virtual reality” two decades ago, has noted that such 
access to behavioral targeting has even more appeal to the “tawdry” 
kinds of firms than the “dignified side of capitalism,” since 
“ambulance chasers . . . and snake oil salespeople” among the 
capitalist class thrive on such targeted access to their victims.111 
Lanier argues that: 
Google’s thing is not advertising . . . . It’s a link. It’s just 
a little tiny minimalist link . . . . What they’re doing is 
they’re saying, “You give us money, we give you access to 
these people, and then what you do with them is up to 
you.” It’s a gate keeping function. It’s an arbiter of access. 
It’s turning connections instead of being open into being 
paid.112 
This also emphasizes that Google’s version of advertising is distinct 
in its function from other traditional advertising. 
A. Racial and Economic Profiling Online 
Study113 after study114 has shown that employers, financial 
lenders, car salesmen, and other merchants use profiling to charge 
black and Hispanic customers more for the same product or service 
when they can identify them. For example, a study by the Urban 
Institute using paired “testers”—one white person and one person 
of color with similar economic profiles—found that nonwhite 
 
 110.  See Acquisti & Varian, supra note 83, at 373. 
 111.  Brockman, supra note 11. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
ALL OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL: A PAIRED TESTING STUDY OF MORTGAGE LENDING 
INSTITUTIONS (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000504 
_All_Other_Things_Being_Equal.pdf. 
 114.  Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More 
Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 
94 AM. ECON. REV. 991 (2004). 
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homebuyers received less favorable financial terms from mortgage 
lending institutions.115 Job seekers face similar discrimination. One 
study, where nearly identical resumes were sent to 1300 help 
wanted ads, found that resumes with a “white-sounding” name were 
fifty percent more likely to get a call for an interview than one with 
a “black-sounding” name.116 Just in 2012, the U.S. Department of 
Justice negotiated a $175 million settlement with Wells Fargo for 
illegally steering more than 30,000 black and Hispanic borrowers 
between 2004 and 2009 into more costly subprime mortgages or 
charging them higher fees than comparable white borrowers.117 
Online behavioral targeting can combine a home address and 
a few more characteristics to create an almost perfect proxy for 
race. Rebecca Goldin, a George Mason University professor, argued 
in a 2009 article that while it’s clearly illegal to discriminate based 
on race, if companies offer loan rates based on shopping habits, it 
raises the question, “[w]ould it be legal or ethical to use the kind of 
music one buys to determine his or her loan rate . . . ?”118 The 
Supreme Court has essentially invited such data-driven 
discrimination by prohibiting explicit race preferences or 
discrimination but allowing disparate impact along racial lines as 
long as decisions were made based on “race-neutral” criteria.119 
 
 115.  TURNER ET AL., supra note 113, at 1. 
 116.  Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 114, at 991. 
 117.  James O’Toole, Wells Fargo in $175M Discriminatory Lending Settlement, 
CNN MONEY (July 12, 2012, 1:12 PM), available at LEXIS (stating that a typical 
African-American borrower paid nearly $3000 more in fees than a similarly 
qualified white applicant). In an echo of the search for “myopic” customers 
promoted by Google’s Varian, in a subprime-mortgage-related lawsuit, Washington 
Mutual loan officer Greg Saffer related in a legal filing that trainers at his bank 
instructed loan officers to target subprime loans to poor areas and that the “best 
areas to market are in lower income areas like Compton and Long Beach because 
the people are less sophisticated there.” Confessions of an Economic Hate Crime, DAS 
KRAPITAL (July 30, 2012), http://www.daskrap.com/2012/7/confessions-economic 
-hate-crime. 
 118.  Rebecca Goldin, Doting on Data, 56 NOTICES AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y 
483, 486 (2009), available at http://www.ams.org/notices/200904/rtx090400483p 
.pdf (reviewing AYRES, supra note 68). 
 119.  Justice O’Connor argued for “race-neutral means to increase minority 
business participation” in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 
(1989). See also Owens v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 3:03-CV-1184-H, 2005 
WL 1837959, at *14–15 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2005) (stating even if credit scores have 
disparate impact on minorities, race-neutral business reasons for credit scores 
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As Colorlines has noted, “a user’s browsing history, their 
location and IP information . . . combined with information 
available in Google’s public data explorer (including [U.S.] census, 
education, population, STD stats, and state financial data) 
presumably could also be folded into the personalized search 
algorithm to surmise a lot more than your race.”120 While not 
conclusive, there is evidence of companies using names or other 
evidence such as physical location to offer differential advertising 
through Google based on race and ethnicity.121 
B. Google and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
What is unquestionable is that Google advertising lay at the 
heart of the largest example of price discrimination and consumer 
harm of the last few decades, namely the subprime mortgage 
destruction of family wealth and the financial crisis that followed. 
Google isn’t usually identified as a big player in the subprime 
mortgage debacle and its aftermath, but a significant portion of 
Google’s profits in the mid-2000s were coming straight from 
subprime mortgage lenders advertising on its site. As Jeff Chester of 
the Center for Digital Democracy said back in 2007, “[m]any 
online companies depend for a disproportionate amount of their 
income on financial services advertising, with subprime in some 
cases accounting for a large part of it.”122 To give some sense of its 
 
allow their use); Powell v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 310 F. Supp. 2d 481, 488 (N.D.N.Y. 
2004) (stating that nonsubjective credit indicators that have disparate impact on 
minorities are permissible). 
 120.  Jorge Rivas, Google Calls Racial Profiling Claims ‘Wildly Inaccurate’, 
COLORLINES (Sept. 28, 2011, 10:10 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2011 
/09/google_responds_to_preliminary_study_says_their_ads_dont_racially_profile 
.html. 
 121.  See Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, 56 COMM. ASS’N 
COMPUTING MACHINERY 44, 44 (2013) (finding ads associate term “arrested” with 
black-sounding names more than with white-sounding names); Nathan Newman, 
Racial and Economic Profiling in Google Ads: A Preliminary Investigation (Updated), 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 20, 2011, 3:17 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/nathan-newman/racial-and-economic-profi_b_970451.html (discussing a survey 
that found examples of different ads being served up based on the ethnicity of 
names and location of the computer). 
 122.  Jeff Chester, Role of Interactive Advertising and the Subprime Scandal: Another 
Wake-up Call for FTC, DIGITAL DESTINY (Aug. 28, 2007, 11:00 AM), http://www 
.democraticmedia.org/jcblog/?p=349. 
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importance, Nielsen//Netratings released research in July 2007 of 
the online display advertisers spending the most money.123 The top 
five online advertisers were involved in the mortgage lending 
industry to some extent, delivering almost $200 million in monthly 
revenue to online advertising companies like Google, with literally 
over a hundred billion views of those online ads driving the frenzy 
for refinancing and subprime mortgages with ads like 
“LowerMyBills” and other online enticements.124 
Those numbers above are for display ads only, a segment in 
which Google was and is a prime player through its Doubleclick 
purchase. Google does not share data on specific revenue from 
particular companies on its AdWords and related search 
advertising, but reports at the time showed the mortgage 
companies paying top dollar for related keywords like “mortgage” 
and “refinance,” with prices going as high as twenty to thirty dollars 
for each user that clicked on an ad using those terms.125 
Companies enticed customers with unrealistic “teaser rates”—
heavily advertised online—that burdened borrowers with toxic 
terms and unmanageable obligations that exploded in later years.126 
And the racial and exploitive aspect of the mortgage meltdown was 
endemic with what some scholars described as reverse redlining, 
“the practice of targeting borrowers of color for loans on 
unfavorable terms.”127 This offering of differential rates based on 
the characteristics of the borrower constitutes the most damaging 
price discrimination inflicting consumer harm in American 
history,128 for which Google played an integral (and profitable) role 
 
 123.  Press Release, Nielsen//NetRatings, Nielsen//NetRatings Reports 
Topline U.S. Data for July 2007 (Aug. 13, 2007), http://www.nielsen-online 
.com/pr/pr_070813.pdf. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Faisal Laljee, Subprime Mortgage Bust Could Create Ad Trouble for Google, 
SEEKING ALPHA (Feb. 22, 2007, 4:04 AM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/27736 
-subprime-mortgage-bust-could-create-ad-trouble-for-google. 
 126.  See Chester, supra note 122. 
 127.  Raymond H. Brescia, Subprime Communities: Reverse Redlining, the Fair 
Housing Act and Emerging Issues in Litigation Regarding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 
2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 164, 167 (2009). 
 128.  See Michelle Singletary, King’s Dream Deferred, One More Victim of the 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2008, at F01, available at LEXIS 
(“[T]he subprime mortgage crisis has caused the largest loss of wealth for black 
and Latino homeowners in modern U.S. history.”). 
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as an advertising intermediary where it was earning billions of 
dollars a year. 
C. Google’s Continued Role in Facilitating Financial Exploitation of 
Consumers 
The financial industry remains the bedrock of Google’s 
advertising revenues.129 According to WordStream, a company 
specializing in helping companies bid effectively on Google Ads, 
the three most expensive categories of keyword searches as 
measured by cost per click are in financial services—insurance, 
loans, and mortgages—with 45.8% of the top 10,000 advertising 
keywords falling in those categories.130 
And many of those advertising bidders at Google are from the 
more bottom-feeding aspects of the industry, particularly payday 
loan lenders, who offer extremely high-interest loans for consumers 
made in exchange for a commitment to repayment from the 
person’s next paycheck.131 Such loans have been banned or severely 
restricted as exploitative in multiple states.132 The new Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has been holding hearings 
specifically on abuses in the industry, with CFPB head Richard 
Cordray saying that “some payday lenders [are] engaged in 
practices that present immediate risk to consumers and are clearly 
illegal.”133 
Yet Google actively solicits ads from the industry, including 
setting up a trade booth at the Online Lenders Alliance, a trade 
group comprised mainly of payday lenders.134 Industry observers 
 
 129.  Larry Kim, The Most Expensive Keywords in Google AdWords, 
WORDSTREAM (July 18, 2011), http://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2011/07/18 
/most-expensive-google-adwords-keywords. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Robert X. Cringely, Google’s Pound of Flesh, CRINGELY (Sept. 27, 2010), 
http://www.cringely.com/2010/09/27/googles-pound-of-flesh. 
 132.  Payday Lending State Statutes, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www 
.ncsl.org/issues-research/banking/payday-lending-state-statutes.aspx (last updated 
Sept. 12, 2013). 
 133.  Press Release, Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 
Prepared Remarks at the Payday Loan Field Hearing in Birmingham, Ala., 
(Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/remarks-by-richard 
-cordray-at-the-payday-loan-field-hearing-in-birmingham-al. 
 134.  Cringely, supra note 131. 
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like Robert X. Cringely, who has covered Silicon Valley for over 
twenty-five years, have cited this involvement as a step beyond 
passively accepting ads from dubious sources to actively enabling 
evil. He argues that out of financial self-interest, Google is burying 
bad news about the industry for consumers, since he found Google 
“placed the uniformly negative news items near the bottom of the 
results, below the fold as we used to say in the newspaper 
business.”135 
Whether, as Cringely argues, Google is actively hiding 
damning consumer analysis of the evils of its financial advertisers, 
what is true is that Google maintained ads from illegal mortgage 
“loan modification” firms preying on desperate homeowners even 
after the company was alerted to the problem.136 Such firms 
advertise heavily online with consumers looking for keywords such 
as “stop foreclosure,” then promise solutions that never deliver and 
further impoverish those homeowners facing financial default.137 
Back in February 2011, the consumer group Consumer Watchdog 
published a scathing report highlighting the concentration of such 
firms advertising on Google,138 but Google did nothing about the 
problem until the Treasury Department took regulatory action in 
November of that year under its TARP authority to shut down 
eighty-five of these scam advertisers who were luring customers 
through Google.139 ‘“Many homeowners who fall prey to these 
scams, initially do so through these Web banners and other Web 
advertising,’ Christy Romero, Deputy Special Inspector General for 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program, said in an interview.”140 
 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  See CONSUMER WATCHDOG, LIARS AND LOANS: HOW DECEPTIVE ADVERTISERS 
USE GOOGLE 5–7 (2011), available at http://www.consumerwatchdog.org 
/resources/liarsandloansplus021011.pdf. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Feds Shut Down High-Tech Mortgage Scammers, CBS NEWS (Nov. 16, 2011, 
3:30 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-205_162-57326180/feds-shut-down-high 
-tech-mortgage-scammers/. 
 140.  Id. 
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D. Promoting Illegal Drug Advertisements Earned Google One of the 
Largest Civil Forfeitures in American History 
In a similar vein to Google’s promotion of unethical and 
illegal financial advertisers, in August 2011, Google agreed to pay a 
$500 million civil forfeiture to the federal government, one of the 
largest in history, as part of a settlement penalizing the company 
for illegally and—significantly—knowingly allowing illegal phar-
macies to advertise on its site.141 This was not passive activity by 
Google, but active complicity with advertisers often selling fake 
prescription medicine to desperately ill individuals or marketing 
illegal steroids. “‘[Google founder and CEO] Larry Page knew what 
was going on,’ Peter Neronha, the Rhode Island U.S. Attorney who 
led the probe, told The Wall Street Journal.”142 
As early as 2003, Google was put on notice by the government 
that its advertisements for various foreign-based pharmacies were 
illegal,143 yet the company continued to assist many of them in 
placing and optimizing their AdWords advertisements.144 In fact, a 
follow-up story by the Wall Street Journal detailed how a felon, David 
Whitaker, who ended up collaborating with the federal government 
to target Google, had fled to Mexico and was advanced credit by 
Google and assisted by Google ad executives in designing ads to sell 
illegal steroids and similar products.145 Federal agents created a 
website designed to look “as if a Mexican drug lord had built a 
website to sell HGH and steroids” and Google ad executives worked 
with Mr. Whitaker to find ways around Google’s official rules 
barring such ads.146 Whitaker went on to tape record conversations 
where he directly told Google ad executives that his goal was to be 
“the biggest steroid dealer in the United States.”147 Disturbingly, 
 
 141.  Thomas Catan & Amir Efrati, New Heat for Google CEO: U.S. Says Google’s 
Larry Page Knew About Improper Online Pharmacy Ads, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2011, at 
B1, available at LEXIS. 
 142.  Clint Boulton, Google’s Page Knew of Illegal Pharmacy Ads: DOJ, EWEEK 
(Aug. 28, 2011), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Search-Engines/Googles-Page-Knew 
-of-Illegal-Pharmacy-Ads-DOJ/. 
 143.  Catan & Efrati, supra note 141. 
 144.  Thomas Catan, Con Artist Starred in Sting That Cost Google Millions, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 25, 2012, at A1, available at LEXIS. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. 
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documentation about the individual culpability of Google 
executives was sealed as part of the settlement with prosecutors, 
which prevents other government officials from evaluating the 
evidence in light of broader antitrust and other regulatory 
concerns.148 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE BROAD CONSUMER HARM FROM GOOGLE’S 
MONOPOLY IS NOT BEING CORRECTED BY MARKET MECHANISMS 
These examples are just the most obvious unethical and illegal 
categories of advertisers that have been highlighted due to 
government investigations. What is most worrying is that the nature 
of targeted advertising means that a whole range of niche scams 
and economically exploitive relationships can be focused on those 
most vulnerable to the scam’s appeal, while remaining essentially 
invisible to everyone else, including reporters and researchers 
trying to evaluate the harms from Google’s advertising methods. 
As detailed above, there are broad reasons why consumers are 
not demanding a fair return from Google when trading their 
privacy in exchange for using Google’s services. However, there are 
even more obvious market failures from these broader financial 
losses where consumers lack information on the operations of price 
discrimination and the danger of many of these predatory firms 
advertising online. 
In measuring consumer harm, then, it is therefore the broad 
financial losses to consumer welfare facilitated by lost privacy and 
Google’s data mining efforts, including the predatory behavioral 
targeting of users provided by Google based on its control of user 
data, that should be a prime focus for investigation by antitrust 
regulators and legislative leaders. Much of this is no doubt in the 
day-to-day price discrimination encouraged for businesses using 
online advertising, but a significant fraction is also from companies 
engaged in unethical to illegal activities facilitated by the company. 
The fact that profitable price discrimination depends on a 
combination of user ignorance and service lock-in, according to 
Google’s own Chief Economist Hal Varian,149 means the market 
 
 148.  Boulton, supra note 142; see also Nathan Newman, Erosion of Public Scrutiny 
of Litigation—and Irony of Google Wanting Privacy for Its Judicial Dealings, TECH-
PROGRESS (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.tech-progress.org/?p=101. 
 149.  Acquisti & Varian, supra note 83, at 380. 
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alone cannot address that issue of equity and market power by 
Google. Similarly, markets have shown themselves incapable of 
policing the broader harms to society that stem from wide-scale 
harms such as the subprime mortgage crisis, which stemmed from 
combinations of consumer ignorance and price discrimination in 
mortgage offers. Public action is equally needed to police the 
“tawdry” side of capitalism, whose advertisers seem endemic on 
Google, from its fake “loan modification” scams to illegal 
pharmacies. 
A. Remedies to Address Consumer Harm from Lost Privacy Online 
Traditional antitrust enforcement would help accomplish 
some of these goals and I have described some antitrust remedies, 
including strengthening consumer control over their own data, as a 
way to limit the consumer harm from Google’s monopoly.150 
However, because of the complexity of implementing some of 
these remedies through agencies and the courts, some reforms 
might be implemented better through existing powers of the 
Federal Trade Commission and other agencies. Other measures 
may call for additional legislation to bring both antitrust and 
consumer protection laws more explicitly up-to-date to address the 
broad consumer harm and rising economic inequality stemming 
from data mining online. 
In March 2012, the FTC issued a report, Protecting Consumer 
Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change, that sought to outline a 
framework for privacy protection for businesses to adopt voluntarily 
and, where necessary, policymakers to mandate as part of general 
consumer protection.151 The framework includes so-called “Do Not 
Track” rules for web browsers such as Google’s Chrome browsers to 
ensure user activity can be hidden from advertisers, data portability 
to allow users to switch easily between email and social networking 
services and take their data with them, and greater transparency 
and choice by consumers on where and how they share their data 
with companies.152 There is good evidence from Europe that 
 
 150.  Newman, supra note 8 (manuscript at 62–69). 
 151.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 72–73 (2012), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
 152.  See generally id. 
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privacy regulation can in fact decrease behavioral tracking of users 
online.153 
The FTC framework also suggests companies should be 
required to obtain “express consent” when collecting “sensitive 
data,” such as health and other data regulators might deem most 
subject to abuse.154 While one FTC commissioner questioned 
whether “opt-in” requirements would work for smaller 
companies,155 I would argue that in the case of Google, whether 
through regulation or as a specific antitrust remedy, a detailed and 
explicit “opt-in” consent should be required for any use of the data 
with specific express consent required for any change or new use of 
the data in the future. If users were reluctant to invest the time to 
complete the process of giving such consent, that would actually 
serve a positive purpose in encouraging Google to offer economic 
incentives for users to do so. By jumpstarting a real market for user 
data, not only would that reverse some of the economic 
distribution towards Google, it would open up more space for 
other companies to compete on incentives at that point of friction 
and thereby ease monopoly concerns. Limiting such an opt-in 
requirement for sharing data to Google and other similar large, 
dominant players would avoid the problem that general opt-in 
requirements might lead to users favoring large players to avoid the 
transaction costs of dealing with multiple, smaller players for their 
online needs.156 
One other way to address the fundamental information 
asymmetry between Google and its users in pricing the value of 
user data157 would be to adopt proposals that would require greater 
 
 153.  Avi Goldfarb & Catherine E. Tucker, Privacy Regulation and Online 
Advertising, 57 MGMT. SCI. 57, 69–70 (2011), available at http://dspace.mit.edu 
/openaccess-disseminate/1721.1/64920 (study using 3.3 million survey responses 
to 9,596 different online ads found sixty-five percent drop in effectiveness of 
banner ads in Europe under Privacy Directive compared to countries without 
privacy regulation). 
 154.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 151, at viii. 
 155.  See id. at C-7. 
 156.  See James Campbell et al., Privacy Regulation and Market Structure 2 
(Aug. 15, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1729405 (arguing that general privacy rules favor larger companies). 
 157.  Alexander Furnas, It’s Not All About You: What Privacy Advocates Don’t Get 
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transparency in how Google monetizes that data, such as regular 
reports on the cost per click or other payments to Google based on 
user activities.158 Such information, along with greater data 
portability between services, might actually encourage a market 
where users “vote with their feet”—or, more accurately, their 
data—and demand either a greater share of Google’s profits based 
on that data, switch to competing providers for a better deal, or 
withhold their data altogether after recognizing the pervasive use 
by third parties that they may not want tracking them. Any of those 
outcomes would lessen Google’s power over user data and lessen 
the consumer harm from that control. 
Google accepting some forms of public interest responsibilities 
and regulation, potentially in the form of a consent decree as an 
alternative to divestiture of product assets, might open the doorway 
for a more fundamental restructuring of Google’s guardianship of 
user data to reduce and ideally eliminate the pervasive consumer 
harms from data misuse by its advertisers. A clear first step would 
be to bar Google from engaging in price discrimination itself or 
from knowingly facilitating price discrimination where different 
groups are secretly offered different prices by its advertisers. As 
Stiglitz and Salop argue, a “rational economic planner”—in this 
case a government-backed consent antitrust decree—could 
economize on wasteful information-seeking costs by “eliminating 
the price dispersion” associated with price discrimination.159 
Such an approach to Google should also bring the company 
under Dodd-Frank Financial Services regulation, given the 
percentage of its advertising revenue derived from the financial 
services industry. It would be appropriate for the new CFPB to 
regularly audit practices by Google, such as facilitating predatory 
price discrimination and other financial scams online, which harm 
consumers. The CFPB is tasked not only with regulating abuses by 
the banking industry, but it is also required to restrain abuses by 
larger nonbank participants in the financial system.160 Precisely 
 
-advocates-dont-get-about-data-tracking-on-the-web/254533/ (“The data collectors 
have more information than those they are they are [sic] collecting the data from; 
the persuaders more [sic] power than the persuaded.”). 
 158.  Whittington & Hoofnagle, supra note 44, at 1367 (outlining a version of 
such a proposal). 
 159.  Salop & Stiglitz, supra note 71, at 494. 
 160.  The CFPB, in developing its rules, noted the source of this authority. 
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because so many of these predatory offers are hidden from public 
view, the CFPB could play a prime role in improving data collection 
and better assessing the financial harm to consumers from these 
advertiser practices online. By closely overseeing how Google and 
other related online advertising players collect and share the 
personal data they control with financial services firms, many of the 
abuses that fueled the concern that created the CFPB in the first 
place could be reined in before consumers fall victim to fraudulent 
or discriminatory offers. 
B. How Government Intervention Addresses Rising Economic Inequality 
As more of the economy moves online, the importance of data 
mining and asymmetry of control of information becomes ever 
more critical in economic markets. Addressing this change calls for 
reevaluating both the economic assumptions underlying much 
recent antitrust scholarship, especially the scholarship influenced 
by the Chicago School,161 and taking far more active regulatory 
action to reverse the trends undermining user privacy and 
increasing economic inequality due to that rising information 
asymmetry. 
With an eye on Google, such pressure might translate into a 
greater focus on sharing the financial bounty of user information 
with those users, serving both equity and competition. The less 
companies like Google are able to use privacy violations for anti-
competitive purposes, the better guardian of legitimate privacy 
concerns such companies will become. At least one writer has 
compared the market failure of providing privacy and data 
protection to that of poor user information on food and safety a 
hundred years ago, explicitly highlighting the way equity and 
 
See Defining Larger Participants in Certain Consumer Financial Product and 
Service Markets, 77 Fed. Reg. 9592 n.3 (Feb. 17, 2012) (codified at 12 C.F.R. 
§ 1090 (2013)) (“Section 1024 of the Act applies to nondepository (nonbank) 
covered persons and expressly excludes from coverage persons described in 
sections 1025(a) or 1026(a) of the Act. Under section 1002(6) of the Act, a 
‘covered person’ means ‘(A) any person that engages in offering or providing a 
consumer financial product or service; and (B) any affiliate of a person described 
[in (A)] if such affiliate acts as a service provider to such person.’”). 
 161.  See Manne & Wright, supra note 20, at 179 n.21. 
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consumer safety concerns of crusaders like Upton Sinclair should 
be the precedent for action today.162 
What the case of Google highlights most of all is the way the 
data mining of individual privacy is fundamentally reshaping 
markets by transferring so much knowledge about user interests, 
behavior, and desires into a few corporate hands. Such information 
asymmetry is easily converted into economic inequality when one 
side of every transaction has so much more knowledge about the 
other during bargaining. The last four decades have seen a steady 
increase in economic inequality,163 which is only partially explained 
by standard explanations centered on the rise of economic returns 
to education, globalized trade, and political changes. The 
increasing information asymmetry in consumer markets, driven by 
data mining and facilitated by online services such as Google, may 
be an additional significant cause of this overall increase in 
economic inequality. Internet visionary Jaron Lanier sums up the 
change as “wealth is measured by how close you are to one of the 
big servers” and Google sits on one of the largest network of servers 
in the world acting as “private spying agencies” on behalf of its 
advertising clients.164 
Government authorities using antitrust and other regulatory 
tools can stem at least part of this trend by restoring a degree of 
control by individuals over what personal data is shared online and 
the financial terms on which that data is shared. This in turn can 
eliminate some of the information-based inequality in the modern 
marketplace that is driving the overall economic inequality. If 
nothing else, a broad antitrust investigation of Google can be a 
chance for a much broader public debate on the abuses of data 
mining online and how to make all markets work more fairly for 
average working families. 
 
 
 162.  Benjamin R. Sachs, Note, Consumerism and Information Privacy: How Upton 
Sinclair Can Again Save Us from Ourselves, 95 VA. L. REV. 205, 239–50 (2009) 
(suggesting a tort liability standard for companies experiencing data breaches to 
force them to tighten security for users). 
 163.  Kathy Ruffing, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, “Gini Index” from 
Census Confirms Rising Inequality over Four Decades, OFF THE CHARTS (Sept. 19, 
2013, 4:10 PM), http://www.offthechartsblog.org/gini-index-from-census-confirms 
-rising-inequality-over-four-decades/. 
 164.  Brockman, supra note 11. 
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